In a report published by Channel 12 on Friday, Gulf affairs expert Dr. Yoel Guzansky stated that the attacks on infrastructure, the distancing from Washington, and the damage to the economy may not topple the Saudi monarchy by tomorrow morning. However, in a world where all power is concentrated in the hands of one individual, any ongoing external crisis could turn into an internal political threat.
The researcher added in a report he shared with "Video News Agency" that the "Israeli National Security Studies Institute" noted that Saudi Arabia is currently facing an unprecedented mix of security, economic, and political challenges, among the most severe it has encountered in recent decades. The war with Iran and its allies exposes its security vulnerabilities, damages its infrastructure and energy exports, burdens its economy, and questions the fundamental assumptions upon which its policies have been built in recent years, primarily its ability to ensure a stable regional environment and reliable U.S. security support.
The crisis coincides with profound economic, social, and political transformations centered around Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In this context, a question arises that was not previously on the agenda: Could the accumulation of pressures on the kingdom undermine the stability of the Al Saud?
The war against the Houthis has revealed Riyadh's weakness, and the uniqueness of the current crisis lies in its simultaneous testing of the two fundamental promises that Bin Salman built the new political system upon: security and prosperity. Vision 2030 is not merely an economic plan; it is part of a new social contract, promising the Saudi people growth, employment, social openness, and improved living standards in exchange for accepting strict political centralization.
However, the war undermines the conditions that made this vision possible. The damage to infrastructure, disruptions in energy exports, and increased defense spending are all factors forcing Riyadh to change its priorities. The kingdom is still far from a financial crisis, but the most crucial political question is not whether it will run out of money, but whether it can continue to provide the path to prosperity promised to its citizens. As the need grows to choose between security and economic development and welfare, new centers of discontent are likely to emerge.
The promise of security is also under test. Despite massive investments in the military, Saudi Arabia struggles to protect its vast territory and all its strategic assets from threats from various fronts. Doubts about the United States' willingness to intervene to defend it in any scenario, along with limited assistance from Pakistan and Turkey, exacerbate the gap between the promise of security and the ability to deliver it. This gap could harm investor confidence and the public's sense of security.
The author adds that the greatest challenge to the stability of the regime may stem from the changes Bin Salman has made to the structure of governance. Over the past decade, he has weakened competing power centers, reduced the independence of the religious institution, and largely replaced the family system of checks and balances with a centralized system linked to him personally. These steps have granted him exceptional control and executive ability, but at the same time, they have diminished internal balancing mechanisms: as Bin Salman's influence grows, the stability of the regime increasingly depends on his personal success. While achievements are attributed to him, failures can also be traced back to him.
The report indicates that the real political danger does not necessarily lie in a popular uprising, but in the possibility that a prolonged crisis could provide an opportunity for disgruntled elements within the royal family and the traditional elites who have been forced to cede power. There is currently no evidence of such an organization, but the erosion of security and prosperity, especially if coupled with a succession crisis or tensions at the top of the hierarchy, could shift the balance of internal power.
The author concludes that the cost of maintaining stability in the kingdom is increasing. The danger does not arise from a single threat, but from a compounding of pressures that may feed into one another: security breaches alienate investors, economic slowdown reduces the capability to allocate resources, and disappointment with government promises may deepen tensions within the elite. There are currently no indicators of an imminent collapse, but the longer the war lasts, the greater the risk that the external crisis will evolve into an internal political one. The question is not only whether the Al Saud will withstand the war, but who among them will emerge from it, and what Bin Salman's status will be.