Iranian-made naval mines, ranging from contact types to sensor-based types, are part of the country's stealth naval capability to control the Strait of Hormuz; weapons that have demonstrated, according to the Revolutionary Guards' data, their practical role in imposing movement restrictions by stopping oil tankers that cross illegal routes.
In his message on the occasion of the Sacred Defense Week and the second anniversary of the martyrdom of Mr. Hassan Nasrallah, the Leader of the Islamic Revolution referred to the "shift in the balance of power in the southern waters," comparing the era of Iranian dependency to the progress the country has achieved today. He emphasized that "the strikes of the Guardians of the Strait of Hormuz forced the aggressors to retreat," after these waters had been a playground for enemy forces.
With the start of the war on February 28, 2026, Iran imposed broad restrictions on movement in the Strait of Hormuz, where Iranian authorities announced that the passage of ships must be coordinated with Iran, and vessels associated with the U.S., the Zionist entity, and their allies were not permitted to cross. The naval forces of the Revolutionary Guards designated "the routes declared by Iran only as permissible routes," warning of the risks of movement outside them. In this context, passage through the strait became conditional on coordination with Iran and adherence to the specified routes. The role of naval mines in enforcing these restrictions was evident in the official statements of the Revolutionary Guards, particularly in the statement of October 23, 2026, issued by the naval forces of the Revolutionary Guards.
According to a statement released on Saturday (October 23, 2026), two giant oil tankers attempting to navigate the illegal southern route of the Strait of Hormuz collided with naval mines, resulting in a massive explosion and fire in the engine room that halted their movement. According to the Revolutionary Guards' naval forces, the tankers were carrying a combined total of over 4.5 million barrels of crude oil, and their crews had to abandon them after the incident. From a strategic perspective, this news reveals the role Iran assigns to naval mines in supporting its sovereignty policy and controlling movement. Defining routes and requiring ships to coordinate necessitates operational support, with mines being part of this support alongside other naval capabilities. Additionally, the danger of collision with mines makes crossing outside declared routes perilous, increasing the cost of ignoring Iranian warnings.
The "Soudaf" family is among the known Iranian naval mines mentioned in public reports. Alongside it comes the "Maham" family, which includes both contact and sensor-based mechanisms. This diversity indicates that the development of mines in Iran has not been limited to one type or operational method.
"Maham 1" is a controlled contact naval mine. The body of this type of mine remains in the water column through its connection to a weight or anchor, with contact being the basis for its activation. The American arms database "Odin" includes two types of this Iranian product: 01 and 02, with the second type being the larger version. In contrast, "Maham 2" is classified in the specialized munitions database "Mattis," associated with the "Phoenix Insight" institute, as an Iranian bottom mine equipped with acoustic and magnetic sensors. This type settles on the seabed and operates by receiving physical indicators of a ship's presence; thus, unlike contact mines, it does not require direct collision with its target.
"Maham 3" uses acoustic and magnetic sensors but is classified under "controlled floating mines." In this product, a combination of maintaining position in the water column and non-contact detection capabilities sets it apart from traditional contact models. Meanwhile, "Maham 7" is included in some specialized reports as "bottom mines with acoustic and magnetic sensors." This weapon rests on the seabed and interacts with indicators of a ship's presence without needing a direct collision, although the technical details published about it are not uniform. The industrial significance of this development lies in "the increased role of sensors and electronic circuits in weapon operation." In the sensor-based model, effectiveness is not limited to the body and explosive payload, but also includes signal reception, processing, and reliable performance in the marine environment. However, possessing a sensor does not necessarily mean a clear distinction between friend and foe.
In addition to contact and sensor-based models, internal reports have referred to another category known as "mobile mines." A report from the "Mashregh" site in February 2025, republished by the "Tasnim" agency, stated that "Arvand" and "Maham" are models of smart mobile mines produced by the Ministry of Defense, and indicated that the Iranian navy has been supplied with new models of naval mines. This media announcement reflects "an interest in developing new categories of underwater weapons," although detailed specifications regarding range, type of guidance, and operational survivability are not reliably available in reviewed public sources. The apparent similarity of this equipment to torpedoes is not sufficient to conclude that their missions and mechanisms of operation are identical, suggesting that these weapons may have different functions from traditional torpedoes.
The weak defense of large warships against mines illustrates that advanced equipment does not provide complete immunity. The American frigate "Samuel B. Roberts" collided with a naval mine on April 14, 1988, sustaining severe damage. Although it did not sink, it required repairs to return to service, an incident revealing the vulnerability of a warship against underwater threats. The significance of this experience lies in "the different roles of defense systems." Long-range radars, air defense missiles, and electronic warfare equipment do not substitute for specialized means of mine detection and countermeasures. A fleet capable of attacking distant targets needs another capability for safe passage through areas suspected of having mines. The strong Iranian weapon: naval mines lethal to the American enemy. The strategic role of naval mines is evident in the concept of "maritime deterrence," which makes the use of reciprocal force in a water area difficult and costly. Imposing restrictions does not necessarily require having a fleet the size of the enemy's, which is why it gains particular importance in asymmetric defense. Iranian naval mines, alongside anti-ship missiles, torpedoes, submarines, and warships, form a "complementary layer." The strategic message of this capability is that "the presence of large ships and possessing greater firepower does not alone guarantee freedom of operation at sea; the security of surface movement also depends on the underwater situation."